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Policy Space for Mexican Maize: 








Since the introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994, traditional maize farmers in Mexico have faced difficult economic conditions.  In 
barely more than a decade, as many as one million farmers may have abandoned their 
land under economic pressure from rising imports, low prices for maize and other 
traditional crops, weak local and regional demand, and large reductions in public sector 
support for agriculture.  The losses are environmental as well as economic.  With the loss 
of traditional maize, there has been a documented loss of the agricultural biodiversity of 
which these farmers and their ancestors have been stewards for centuries.  With maize 
trade scheduled to be fully liberalized under NAFTA in 2008, many farm groups are 
calling for a renegotiation of the treaty’s agricultural provisions to prevent further 
damage.  This policy analysis examines the room for alternative policies in Mexico under 
existing economic and environmental agreements, including NAFTA.  It concludes that 
the Mexican government retains access to many useful policy instruments that could 
promote rural livelihoods while arresting the losses of important maize diversity.  What is 





Mexico is the world’s center of origin for maize, which remains the country’s 
most important agricultural crop, most critical source of nutrition, most significant source 
of livelihoods, and the center of Mexican culture.  Maize is also one of the world’s most 
important food crops.  In Mexico, small-scale producers continue to act as stewards of the 
country’s agro-biodiversity, cultivating more than forty distinct maize landraces adapted 
to diverse agro-ecological conditions and human needs.  Mexico’s maize diversity, 
maintained not only in the world’s largest maize gene bank but in situ in farmers’ fields, 
is an important source of germplasm in the development of hybrid maize varieties for use 
in industrial agriculture (Boyce 1999). 
 
 
1 An early version of this paper was presented at the XXVIII Colloquium on Regional Anthropology and 
History, “Desde los Colores del Maíz: Una Agenda para el Campo Mexicano,” held in October 2006 at El 
Colegio de Michoacán, Zamora, Mexico.  It will appear in Spanish in a forthcoming collection from the 
colloquium. The author benefited from the rich exchange at that three-day forum and from comments there 
by researchers too numerous to name.  In addition he would like to thank Hugo Alonso Garcia, Alejandro 
Nadal, Doreen Stabinsky, Howard Mann, Steve Suppan, and Kevin P. Gallagher for their helpful 
comments.  Elanor Starmer and Muriel Calo provided invaluable research assistance. 
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My own research and that of many others has documented the negative impact 
that neoliberal economic policies in general, and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in particular, have had on Mexico’s small-scale maize producers.  
The Mexican government unilaterally waived most of the import restrictions built into 
NAFTA’s 15-year transition to full liberalization in maize trade and failed to avail itself 
of other opportunities to protect or promote small-scale maize farming.  As a result, corn 
imports from the United States increased three-fold after NAFTA, prices dropped by 
nearly half, and 2.5-3 million poor farmers in Mexico have found themselves under 
increasing economic pressure (Nadal and Wise 2004).  While the United States increased 
its support for agriculture – roughly doubling its commodity support budget – Mexico’s 
farm programs declined dramatically.  The two countries’ support for maize farmers in 
particular followed a similar trend, with U.S. support rising 48% in real terms to $8.3 
billion in 2004, while Mexico’s inflation-adjusted subsidies declined 39% to $842 million 
(OECD 2005).  Since 1997, the United States has exported its corn to Mexico and the rest 
of the world at prices estimated to be nearly 20% below average farmer costs of 
production, one definition of “dumping” (Murphy, Lilliston et al. 2005). 
 
The socio-economic impact on rural Mexico has been dramatic.  While the 
countryside has suffered an economic shock treatment, it has not produced the economic 
adjustments most policy-makers predicted.  An estimated 1.5 million Mexican farmers 
have left farming since NAFTA took effect in 1994, but the rural sector in general, and 
the maize sector in particular, remain large and economically important.  Rural poverty 
remains intractable, and rural migration rates have soared (Taylor and Dyer 2003).   
 
If NAFTA’s impacts on farmers’ livelihoods raise concerns about poverty and 
migration out of rural areas and out of maize farming, these in turn pose broader 
questions of global importance for genetic diversity in maize in the crop’s birthplace.  
These concerns grew all the more serious in 2001 with the discovery in the southern state 
of Oaxaca of native maize fields contaminated with transgenic maize, almost certainly 
from grain imported for food from the United States (NACEC 2004).  
 
In the liberalized North American market, low-cost monoculture corn floods the 
Mexican market while genetic diversity, a global public good, has little or no economic 
value.  As a result, farmers’ stewardship of maize diversity goes largely unrewarded, 
except in regional markets where local landraces earn a premium.  These dynamics create 
a classic public policy challenge.  Trade liberalization is extending the reach of private 
property and market relations into areas previously protected from such pressures.  
Meanwhile, environmental factors remain largely externalized in such market relations.  
This leaves environmental goods, particularly those that reside in the global commons, 
vulnerable to degradation.  If in situ maize genetic diversity is indeed of value, and if 
Mexico’s small-scale farmers are critical to its preservation, then new policies must 
protect maize farmers from economic pressures that are leading them to abandon the 
land.  New policies must promote ways to sustain the production of biodiverse maize. 
 
In this paper, I will examine the policy space that Mexico could have at its 
disposal to pursue alternative policies to protect traditional maize and the farmers who 
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are the very human link in the plant’s ongoing evolution.  While the present Mexican 
administration seems loathe to avail itself of such policy options, they are worth 
examining.  Recent price increases for tortillas, Mexico’s most important staple food, 
have highlighted the food-security risks associated with dependence on foreign supplies 
of maize.  While the NAFTA model has certainly promoted the agriculture and trade 
policies Mexico has followed, it would be a mistake to think that the agreement has 
closed off all avenues for Mexican government action. 
 
After presenting an analytical framework for understanding the limitation of 
markets in dealing with a global environmental good such as plant genetic diversity, I 
will offer some preliminary evidence from a forthcoming study by colleagues at El 
Colegio de Mexico of maize farmers in the state of Veracruz, which shows how alarming 
these trends are.  I will then identify some of the policy space that exists within Mexico’s 
existing international obligations, reviewing briefly the differential support systems in the 
U.S. and Mexico toward maize.  I will look more closely at the policy space afforded by 
Mexico’s environmental agreements.  I will conclude with a rationale for using this 
policy space to mobilize Mexican and international support for an alternative set of 
policies toward Mexico’s maize sector. 
 
Framework: Agro-biodiversity, market failure, and state intervention 
 
In recent years, and particularly since the approval of the Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD) in 1992, increasing attention has been paid to understanding on-farm 
diversity, the causes of its erosion, and the policies and practices that can prevent the loss 
of important stocks of traditional crop varieties. Though the convention focused 
overwhelmingly on the threats to wild biodiversity, the CBD mandates in situ 
conservation of agro-biodiversity as well.  It also recognizes the importance of 
indigenous and local communities and their rights to benefits-sharing. 
 
The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has begun to document 
global agro-biodiversity and the extent of genetic erosion (FAO 1997; FAO 1999).  
Meanwhile, early calls to action on agro-biodiversity conservation (e.g., Wilkes, 
Yeatman et al. 1981) are being taken up by a growing number of researchers concerned 
with the economic causes of diversity loss (see, for example, Fowler and Mooney 1990; 
Mooney 1996; Tripp and van der Heide 1996; Thrupp 1998; ETC, GRAIN et al. 2001; 
Mooney 2001). 
 
In many ways, the international seed-collection systems have served crop 
breeders well. The system defined the world’s pool of seeds as a public good. The 
thousands of so-called accessions in gene banks, which were developed and maintained 
largely with public funds, were accessible at no charge to researchers and crop breeders. 
New hybrids developed by private companies from this rich gene pool, of course, were 
not public goods but were sold to farmers for a profit. These profits in part funded 
ongoing private research into new varieties, but they did not return value in any 
significant way to the gene banks’ maintenance or the international system of collection 
and storage.  More important, they did not compensate the millions of small-scale 
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farmers who have, for generations, overseen the adaptation of maize to diverse 
environments, dietary demands, and cultural preferences.  One study estimated that .001 
percent of the value derived from bioprospected native plants has been returned to the 
communities from which the plants came (Pimbert 1999). 
 
Of the main cereal crops, maize has retained the greatest diversity because it is 
open-pollinated (as opposed to self-pollinated), and the improvements in temperate 
strains do not translate easily into tropical areas.  Still, it tends to have the greatest 
pressure on diversity because it is the crop in which there have been the greatest 
productivity gains from hybrids.  This has made the maize seed industry more heavily 
commercial.  By comparison, wheat and rice improvements do not so readily pay for the 
R&D costs associated with their development.  Maize’s remaining diversity owes to the 
high costs of improved seeds and their limited applicability to the poor growing 
environments of traditional farmers (Smale, Bellon et al. 2001). 
 
Global economic integration increases pressure on agro-biodiversity. Market 
integration promotes specialization and an exclusive focus on high-yield varieties, as 
national markets become dominated by low-priced imports from the agricultural 
surpluses of the largest producers. This leads to the loss of local varieties as well as minor 
crops. Globalization also replaces local cultural traditions with “modern” preferences; 
wheat bread supplants the market for corn tortillas in Mexico, while imported corn flour 
further displaces flour made from traditional corn varieties within the national tortilla 
market. Livelihood pressures lead to the need for off-farm employment to supplement 
incomes. This results in declining attention to traditional farming, and often to wholesale 
migration and the abandonment of farming altogether (Almekinders 2001). 
  
Environmental economists have explained this dynamic well (see Swanson, 
Pearce et al. 1994).  Genetic erosion is built into the current system of economic 
incentives. Modern agriculture depends on traditional agriculture for genes but returns 
nothing to it, resulting in the erosion of the source on which it depends for raw material. 
As a public good, many of the values of crop genetic diversity – systemic stability, 
reduced yield variability – are “non-appropriable values.” This creates a bias toward 
conversion to high-yielding varieties, since incentive structures reward only these 
“downstream” values, such as exploration (plant breeding), not the “upstream” values 
contributed by traditional farmers (Correa 1999). This leaves it to governments to 
determine and supply the appropriate levels of diversity-related “crop insurance,” but 
they will undersupply it because the values involved – reduced variability and 
vulnerability in world food yields and prices – are global in nature. 
 
Few studies have specifically linked the erosion of diversity to the process of 
global economic integration. One researcher carried out field studies of traditional jute 
production in Bangladesh, which is being displaced by imported synthetic fibers, and 
traditional corn production in Mexico, which is threatened by hybrid corn imports from 
the United States following trade liberalization. He argues that we are seeing the 
“globalization of market failure,” as economic integration links imperfect markets in 
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environmentally destructive ways. In both cases, the market prices for modern, Northern 
products fail to incorporate significant negative environmental externalities. Meanwhile, 
traditional producers go uncompensated for the positive environmental externalities 
associated with traditional production. The study shows that nearly the entire price 
advantage enjoyed by synthetics over jute – about 35 per cent – would be eliminated if 
environmental externalities were factored into prices (Boyce 1999). 
 
Environmental economists and policymakers sometimes seek to address such 
market failures through market-based policies to internalize externalities.  This involves 
efforts to quantify the value contributed to modern agriculture by the genetic stocks 
maintained by traditional farmers. There is general agreement that these values are very 
difficult to quantify, and even more difficult to internalize (Evenson, Gollin et al. 1998).  
One study estimated that genetic improvements to U.S. crops from existing diversity 
increased the value of harvests by an average of $1 billion per year from 1930-1980 
(Cromwell, Cooper et al. 2001). Still, valuation fails to provide meaningful guidance for 
preservation efforts. In part, this is due to the limited development of any functional 
systems of payment for environmental services (PES) for such diversity. Valuation can 
serve as a guide to price-setting under such schemes, as it has in the case of the emerging 
regime for climate change mitigation, which includes payments for forest conservation 
and development as a form of carbon sequestration. No such widespread regime exists, or 
is likely to develop, in the case of agro-biodiversity.  
 
In practice, few policies have been developed or implemented to achieve 
significant in situ conservation, but recent attention to the importance of on-farm 
diversity has generated a growing body of literature on such efforts.  Based on extensive 
field work, much more is known today about the biological nature of on-farm diversity, 
the location of key centers of diversity for important food crops, the causes of genetic 
erosion, and the farm-management practices that can promote in situ conservation ( Tripp 
and van der Heide 1996; Brush 2000; Friis-Hansen and Sthapit 2000; Smale, Bellon et al. 
2001). 
 
One area that has received attention in recent literature on biodiversity is the 
effort to create niche markets for products made from native crop varieties. Such market-
based schemes – which include the promotion of “diversity fairs” in traditional rural 
areas – could serve to preserve a limited number of varieties in a limited number of 
communities. They also serve as useful pilot projects to test the potential size of such 
markets. But the scope of agro-biodiversity erosion suggests a policy response that goes 
well beyond even the most optimistic estimates of the potential for niche market 
development. One analyst notes, “At present, the space in this market for small-scale 
producers and for product diversity is limited. Globalization, industrialization, and 
technology development have resulted in a market that is increasingly dominated by the 
demand for uniformity, bulk and competitive prices from agro-industry and urban 
markets” (Almekinders 2001, 25). 
 
Altieri, Anderson et al (1987) have argued for a more expansive understanding of 
crop diversity, taking an approach that emphasizes the preservation not only of distinct 
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crop varieties but of the ecosystems as well as the human cultures that developed and 
maintain them. They argue that because agro-ecosystems are directly dependent on 
human management and have evolved under the direct influence of farming practices, 
they cannot be isolated from the cultures of local people. They stress the importance of 
including the entire ecosystem, not just the productive crop unit, in conservation efforts, 
as peasants rely on neighboring land for a wide variety of uses. Crop breeders often view 
these lands as marginally productive, even though they provide essential ecosystem 
services to peasants. 
 
This more holistic approach leads to more ambitious policy prescriptions, linking 
in situ conservation efforts to broad-based rural development programs. “We contend, 
nevertheless, that maintenance of traditional agro-ecosystems and closely associated 
natural ecosystems is the only sensible strategy to preserve in situ repositories of crop 
germplasm.  Conservation of crop genetic resources can still be integrated with 
agricultural development, through rural development projects that preserve the vegetation 
diversity of traditional agro-ecosystems and that are anchored in the peasants’ rationale to 
use local resources and their intimate knowledge of the environment” (Altieri, Anderson 
et al. 1987, 55).  
 
Despite the general acknowledgement of the importance of a supportive 
macroeconomic policy environment for such conservation, and the recent attention to the 
microeconomic aspects of in situ conservation, few researchers have focused on the 
macroeconomic causes of genetic erosion and its relationship to global economic 
integration. Fewer still have examined institutional and policy reforms necessary to 
preserve on-farm diversity (Thrupp 1998). 
 
What is clear from the Mexican case is that there is great danger in leaving the 
fate of valuable genetic wealth in maize to market forces. As a public good, maize 
biodiversity is virtually guaranteed to be undervalued and underprotected in the 
marketplace. The need for a government response to the problem of genetic erosion is 
great, particularly in the current economic environment; both continued crisis and 
sustained recovery pose threats to maize diversity in Mexico. If the economic crisis 
continues, with sluggish overall economic growth and stagnation in the rural economy, 
economic pressures will eventually lead to the depopulation of the countryside and the 
extinction of native species. Paradoxically, recovery may pose an even greater threat. If 
opportunities for improved livelihoods in urban areas present themselves to traditional 
farmers beset by the current state of disinvestment, lack of protection, price shock, and 
failure to compensate valuable environmental services, they may flee the countryside at 
even more alarming rates.  
 
Evidence from Veracruz 
 
New research from Veracruz underscores the severity of the current situation.  
Colleagues at El Colegio de Mexico’s Program on Science, Technology, and 
Development (PROCIENTEC) are now completing a case study for World Wildlife Fund 
on trade, poverty and the environment, examining the implications of changing economic 
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structures under liberalization for natural resource management.  They are studying the 
communities of Soteapan near the Biosphere Reserve Sierra de Santa Marta, which 
include a diverse range of producers, from small-scale commercial producers in the 
lowlands to subsistence producers in the highlands bordering the biosphere reserve.  They 
compare data from earlier surveys with their own surveys done last year.  Together the 
data presents a revealing picture of the emergency situation facing small farmers in 
Mexico and the severe and potentially irreversible environmental impacts of that crisis. 
(The following summary is from the forthcoming report by Nadal and Garcia Rano 
2007.) 
 
Consistent with previous studies, they find that under pressure from imported 
maize after NAFTA, prices fell dramatically in local and regional markets, dropping 50% 
in real terms between 1994 and 2000.  Equally significant, however, prices for other 
important crops in the area also fell, some for reasons unrelated to NAFTA.  Coffee 
prices declined 66% while bean prices fell 44%.  This left producers with few options to 
address their income crisis. 
 
The other dramatic impact on local producers came from the restructuring of local 
and regional markets with the expansion of Maseca, the multinational Mexican firm that 
controls a large share of the domestic market for maize flour.  Through its national 
network of suppliers and its access to inexpensive imports, Maseca can provide year-
round supplies of flour, masa, and tortillas in the area, something local nixtamaleros 
cannot match.  Researchers found that Maseca insisted on year-round contracts with its 
buyers, which made it much more difficult for seasonal millers to gain market access.  As 
a monopsony buyer in local markets, Maseca helped drive prices down to their lowest 
level while at the same time reducing the marketing options for local producers. 
 
The figures are dramatic. The market for maize in the region surrounding 
Soteapan increased 59% from 1990-2004, but Soteapan producers’ share of that market 
dropped by over 40%, from 7.3% to 4.3%.  This had a particularly harsh impact on 
commercial producers in the lowlands who sent a majority of their maize to market.  That 
market continues to shrink as local millers go out of business, unable to compete with 
Maseca. 
 
The income impacts were dramatic as well.  Survey results suggest that between 
1993 and 2005, commercial producers saw their incomes, adjusted for inflation, decline 
by more than 40%.  Subsistence producers saw their real incomes fall by half.  By other 
accounts, real incomes in the region fell over 70% from 1993-2005.  In 2000, 90% of the 
Soteapan working population was earning less than two minimum wages, a common 
Mexican standard for extreme poverty. 
 
This story is by now well-known in Mexico.  Less well-understood are the 
impacts of such income and livelihood losses on the environment.  Our colleagues at El 
Colegio de Mexico found a wide range of negative environmental effects, many related to 
the loss of the traditional milpa system of maize intercropped with beans, squash, and 
other crops.  That system has for generations provided Mexicans with a balanced diet 
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while keeping the agricultural ecosystem in balance as well.  If the observations from 
Soteapan are accurate, the milpa will be a thing of the past unless present trends are 
reversed, and with the milpa will go some of Mexico’s rich store of agricultural 
biodiversity. 
 
One source of pressure on the traditional milpa comes from diversification, as 
producers seek crops that can bring more income from their lands.  Coffee was an early 
attempt at diversification in highland communities, but the persistent price crisis in coffee 
has made it only marginally valuable.  Farmers also experimented with more fruit trees 
(especially papaya), and more recently with palms as a long-term investment in a future 
palm oil market.  They also increased lands devoted to pasture for livestock.   
 
Since 1993, Soteapan producers have reduced the share of their land devoted to 
maize cultivation from 50% to 32%.  The story is far more dire than these troubling 
figures would indicate.  Commercial lowland producers have responded to the crisis by 
expanding the intensive cultivation of hybrid maize varieties, abandoning the milpa 
altogether.  Highland producers have also begun to substitute monoculture hybrid maize 
for their traditional plots.  The reason, in large part, is a shortage of labor, particularly at 
key harvest times. 
 
It is now well documented that rural migration has increased dramatically with the 
crisis in the countryside.  This is evident in Soteapan.  In 1993, few households reported 
any significant migration, either seasonal within Mexico or permanent to the United 
States.  By 2005, over 20% of households reported at least one family member migrating 
temporarily, many to the tomato harvest in Sonora.  Among some of the middle-income 
producers, a similar share report permanent migration to the United States or other parts 
of Mexico.   
 
Because the temporary migration comes at the time of the most intensive need for 
local labor on the milpa, this labor-intensive cultivation process is undermined.  Some 
producers leave and the supply of labor for hire is reduced, driving up wages and making 
it more difficult to supplement family labor with contracted workers.  In addition, the 
traditional systems of shared community labor are falling into disuse. 
 
Thus many of the diversification strategies observed in Soteapan are adaptive 
strategies to reduce the labor investment in the family plot.  Livestock is less labor 
intensive than the milpa, and so is palm and fruit cultivation.  Unfortunately, so too is 
more intensive cultivation of monoculture maize from hybrids using rising levels of agro-
chemicals, a practice observed now not just among commercial producers but also low-
income farmers in the highlands. 
 
The impact on agro-biodiversity is quite evident.  Survey data from the region 
show that whereas the typical producer in 1960 used as many as 12 difference native 
landraces of maize in the milpa, now even traditional producers are growing only three 
landraces, with another two mestizo varieties (hybrids crossed with local varieties), and 
eight different hybrid varieties.  The biodiversity decline is even more dramatic for the 
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milpa as a whole.  In 1960, researchers found as many as 32 different plants in a three-
hectare plot; now the most researchers could find was eight. 
 
El Colegio de Mexico researchers summarize the transformation: “Today, with 
economic pressure from all sides, producers are shifting towards a distorted version of the 
traditional milpa. The reason for this is that yields appear to increase, although not 
enough to reduce the plight of producers’ households. In this transformation, 
monoculture cultivation becomes the main feature of the production system, agro-
chemical inputs develop into a necessity, and the old method based on agro-diversity 
starts to break apart.” (p. 21) 
 
The other noteworthy environmental impact in Soteapan of the transformation of 
the local agricultural economy under liberalization is the rise in unsustainable resource 
extraction from the biosphere reserve.  The most marginalized producers live on the 
borders of the reserve, and many rely on the reserve for fuel wood.  More damaging still, 
one of the main forms of wage labor for these low-income producers is operating a chain 
saw for the industry supplying wood to construction projects in the region and to Pemex, 
which requires vast quantities of wood for scaffolding and other construction needs at its 
installation nearby.  Some 60% of those surveyed said at least one family member hired 
out for this type of work, and they are increasingly sent into the forested reserve, in 
violation of the law, to find wood. 
 
Another rising form of illegal and unsustainable resource extraction is hunting of 
endangered animals including giant toucan, ocelot, emerald iguanas, yellow parrots and 
macaws, and turtles.  Some fetch very high prices on the black market. 
 
PROCIENTEC’s new study adds urgency to the demands to reformulate 
Mexico’s policies toward its traditional maize producers.  There is ample space to 
consider alternative policies. 
 
Policy Space – Subsidies in Mexican-U.S. Maize Trade 
 
What policy space exists within Mexico’s existing international obligations to 
construct an alternative set of policies that could support traditional, biodiverse maize 
production?  NAFTA, with its impending final phase-out in 2008 of allowed protections 
for maize, beans, and a few other products, remains the most formidable obstacle to 
formulating new policies.  The Mexican farmers movement’s call for a renegotiation of 
NAFTA’s agriculture provisions, particularly for white maize and beans, is well justified.  
To protect and promote traditional maize farming, the Mexican government needs the 
power to impose import restrictions on cheap corn flooding Mexican markets from the 
United States.  These are, of course, precisely the measures that NAFTA proscribes. 
 
Mexican researchers have studied in some detail the precedents for such a 
renegotiation, which would not necessarily entail reopening the treaty as a whole.  Side 
agreements not to enforce certain provisions of the treaty on the negotiated schedule have 
been uncommon, but they have taken place, notably regarding the scheduled 2003 
  9GDAE Working Paper No. 07-01: Policy Space for Mexican Maize 
 
 
liberalization of the market for chicken parts (Zahniser and Link 2002).  These are the 
equivalent of so-called Voluntary Export Restraints, limits negotiated outside of existing 
bilateral, regional, or multilateral obligations.  
 
Mexican policy analysts have also studied the policy space that exists within 
NAFTA for continued support for Mexican maize and bean farmers, noting that, as with 
the Mexican government’s unwillingness to enforce the treaty’s tariff-rate quota for 
maize, the government has not availed itself of the powers it has to support traditional 
farmers (WTO 2002; Zahniser 2005).  These include the right to impose emergency 
safeguard measures to address import surges that cause “serious injury” to domestic 
producers. 
 
In this paper, I will not repeat those analyses but rather focus on policy space that 
may exist within Mexico’s international environmental obligations particularly as they 
relate to protecting genetic diversity in maize.  First, though, I will briefly review 
evidence for Mexico’s right to impose countervailing duties on U.S. maize imports due to 
its NAFTA partner’s disproportionately large subsidies to its corn farmers. 
 
NAFTA explicitly allows the parties to the agreement to apply their anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties laws to goods imported from NAFTA partners, provided they 
are consistent with obligations under the GATT.  In agriculture, dumping has generally 
been defined as exporting at prices below domestic prices or at prices lower than the 
export prices charged to other trading partners.  In the case of U.S. corn, neither of these 
conditions prevail; the United States is, as one agricultural economist has said, an “equal 
opportunity dumper,” as willing to underprice its commodities at home as it is abroad.  
While there is little question U.S. corn comes into Mexico at prices consistently below 
production costs – another definition of dumping more commonly applied in the 
manufacturing sector than in agriculture – Mexico could have a difficult time winning an 
anti-dumping case against the United States on corn. 
 
Not so in the case of countervailing duties (CVD), tariffs that can be imposed to 
recoup the potential losses to domestic producers from subsidized imports.  NAFTA 
allows CVDs in cases of proven economic injury to domestic producers from the 
subsidies applied by an exporting country to its goods.  A subsidy valued at more than 
5% of the value of the traded good is considered actionable. The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibited such actions in agriculture among member 
governments under the so-called Peace Clause, which explicitly exempted agricultural 
goods from the GATT’s CVD provisions.  The Peace Clause has now expired, however, 
and the stalled negotiations on a new World Trade Organization agreement leave 
agricultural exporters that heavily subsidize their farmers vulnerable to action.  Canada 
recently began a dispute process against the United States for its heavy subsidization of 
corn. 
 
To make its case for CVDs, Mexico would need first to cut through some of the 
fog of misleading official data on agricultural subsidies.  I will make a brief attempt to 
shine a light through that fog.  Agricultural support is tabulated by the OECD based on 
  10GDAE Working Paper No. 07-01: Policy Space for Mexican Maize 
 
 
detailed submissions of agricultural subsidy and support programs by member states, 
Mexico among them.  The resulting Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is calculated as a 
value in local currency, but it is most commonly presented as the share of farm value 
accounted for by subsidies and price supports, overall and for any given supported crop. 
   
Those figures, at first glance, would suggest that Mexico has little chance of 
mounting a successful demand for the right to impose CVDs on U.S. corn.  As the first 
two bars in Figure 1 show, for the three-year period 1999-2001 Mexico’s PSE of 47% 
actually exceeded the U.S. PSE of 46%.   
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Does Mexico really subsidize its maize farmers at a higher level than the United 
States does?  No, and it is important to understand why these numbers are misleading.  I 
will only briefly summarize the main reasons for the discrepancies between the PSE 
percentages and reality.  (For a more detailed analysis, see Wise 2004.) 
 
1.  The PSE includes non-subsidy support.  This is called Market 
Price Support (MPS) and includes the support to producers from tariff protections, 
price supports, and other forms of non-subsidy government programs.  In the 
years covered in Figure 1, 41% of Mexico’s PSE was accounted for by MPS.  
Take that out, as in the third bar in the graph, and Mexico’s true subsidy 
percentage drops to 28% of the value of maize production. 
 
2.  Non-subsidy support is estimated.  There is good reason to 
exclude MPS in the case of Mexico.  As maize farmers in Mexico will certainly 
attest, these were years in which previous tariff protection and price support 
programs were not operating.  So where did the MPS figure come from?  It is 
  11GDAE Working Paper No. 07-01: Policy Space for Mexican Maize 
 
 
                                                
imputed from the difference between the import price and domestic prices.  Since, 
according to neoclassical economic theory, prices should align in free markets, 
any difference can be assumed to be the impact of government intervention 
policy.  That is what the OECD does in estimating Mexico’s MPS.  U.S. export 
prices are lower than Mexico’s domestic maize prices, so the difference is the 
estimated value of government support whether any support programs exist or 
not. 
 
3.  Non-subsidy support is overstated.  In the case of Mexico, the 
U.S. export price is some 20% below the actual costs of production, a price 
differential that is itself the product of U.S. government policy.  This increases the 
price gap, with the paradoxical effect of raising Mexico’s estimated support 
levels, even if Mexican policies have not changed at all. Higher U.S. support 
results in higher estimates of Mexican support.  For Mexico and the United States, 
it makes much more sense just to compare true government subsidies.
2 
 
4.  Subsidy support is overstated.  Mexico’s subsidy support is 
overstated because of the large productivity differences between the U.S. and 
Mexico, which shows average maize yields one-third of U.S. levels.  Because the 
percentage measure is based on production, the U.S. levels are understated 
relative to Mexico’s.  Reporting subsidies on a per-hectare basis factors out this 
difference.  The last three bars of Figure 1 present this data.  The U.S. maize 
subsidy is $262/ha, while Mexico’s full PSE/ha is $160/ha, and its true subsidies 
(excluding MPS) are just $93/ha, barely one-third the U.S. level, which are 
entirely in the form of subsidies. 
 
Viewed in this light, Mexico has every reason to consider its maize subsidies 
lower than those of its Northern neighbor and has a sound basis for a claim for 
countervailing duties.  In more recent years the U.S. subsidies to its corn farmers have 
gone down somewhat due to higher market prices, to 24% of production value between 
2002-2004, while Mexico’s actual subsidy levels have risen.  But from 2002-2004 
Mexican maize subsidies per hectare, at $128/ha, were still well below the U.S. per-
hectare subsidies of $170. 
 
In fact, the two countries have been moving in opposite directions since NAFTA 
was passed.  Figure 2 shows the changes since 1994 in maize subsidies, indexed and 
adjusted for inflation.  Where Mexico has reduced the value of its payments by about 





2 To some extent, the OECD has acknowledged this problem.  In a technical paper on the adequacy of the 
PSE and the use of distorted reference prices, the OECD notes that for many countries their market price 
support policies are “no more than a defense against the world market price depression that results from 
other countries’ policies” OECD (2003c). Is the Concept of the Producer Support Estimate in Need of 
Revision? Paris, OECD: 18. 






























Source: OECD, author's calculations; 2004 US dollars.
 
 
In addition to the option of defending Mexico’s maize farmers through the 
imposition of countervailing duties, based on U.S. subsidy levels, the country also retains 
the option to increase its own support levels.  While fiscal constraints and the lack of 
political will remain the principal obstacles to raising domestic support levels, it is worth 
noting that Mexico has a great deal of policy space under its GATT commitments, 
because most Mexican agricultural subsidies are notified to the WTO as non-trade-
distorting programs decoupled from production. 
 
Mexico’s total agricultural subsidies (not counting market price support) were 34 
billion pesos in 2004, but its notified trade-distorting support was only about 2.7 billion 
pesos.  Mexico’s Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) limit for 2004 was 25.2 billion 
1991 pesos, or in 2004 currency 141.2 billion pesos.  In other words, Mexico is a 
remarkable 138.5 billion pesos beneath its AMS cap – some $12 billion US dollars – 
policy space that could be used for even the most trade-distorting forms of domestic 
support. 
 
NAFTA and the WTO leave Mexico a good deal of policy space to defend 
Mexico’s traditional maize farmers.  With the WTO’s Peace Clause expired, Mexico 
could avail itself of NAFTA’s provisions for countervailing duties, and an honest 
accounting of relative subsidy levels between the two countries would justify such a 
claim.  In fact, since the duty imposed is based not on the documented material harm but 
on the level of the subsidy, it could be argued that the higher the U.S. corn subsidies the 
more policy space Mexico retains.  In addition to countervailing duties, Mexico could 
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impose even the most trade-distorting forms of domestic support and still not approach 
the limits imposed under the WTO. 
 
Finding Policy Space in the Environment 
 
In addition to the policy space for Mexico to increase its own agricultural 
subsidies or take retaliatory action against U.S. subsidies, environmental concerns may 
provide the most useful vehicle for taking decisive action to protect Mexico’s maize 
farmers and the biodiversity they cultivate.  Some of those opportunities may reside, 
unexplored, in the WTO system itself.  Article XX of the GATT 1994 may allow for 
some protection of biological diversity as an environmental good.  In addition, some 
argue that under Article XI of the GATT Mexico could declare itself a GMO-free zone 
for marketing its exports, do so for domestic marketing as well, and then ban all imports 
of GM corn seeds as protection against contamination.
3  Such claims have not been tested 
but could be explored. 
 
The environmental agreement of greatest relevance, though, is the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, which Mexico has signed but its two NAFTA partners have not. 
While it is questionable whether Mexico is technically in violation of its obligations 
under the treaty, it is undeniable that the government could interpret its obligations in 
such a way that it could dramatically reshape U.S.-Mexico maize trade by insisting on a 
precautionary approach to the importation of genetically modified maize. 
 
The Cartagena Protocol 
 
The Cartagena Protocol was agreed to in 2000 with the goal of ensuring each 
country’s right to protect its biosafety by regulating the transboundary flows of 
potentially hazardous genetically engineered organisms, or, in the parlance of the 
Protocol, “living modified organisms” (LMOs).  The clear intent of the Protocol was to 
require full disclosure of any LMO contents of traded goods so that the importing country 
could decide the level of precaution it wanted to observe and ensure safe handling of any 
LMO it decided to accept.  Mexico has signed and ratified the Protocol, Canada has 
signed but not ratified it, and the United States has done neither.   
 
The precautionary principle is strongly embedded in the Protocol, itself a product 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, granting each signatory the right to take 
precautionary action.  Prior to the first import of any LMO, the importing country can 
choose to carry out a risk assessment. The Protocol does not give specific guidelines on 
particular risk management strategies, but does allow parties to “establish and maintain 
appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies to regulate, manage and control risks…. 
Measures… shall be imposed to the extent necessary to prevent adverse effects of the 
LMO on… biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health” 
(Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2000). The IUCN notes that the 
 
3 Personal communication, Howard Mann, International Institute for Sustainable Development, January 28, 
2007. 
  14GDAE Working Paper No. 07-01: Policy Space for Mexican Maize 
 
 
use of the word “prevent” differs from, and appears to be stronger than, the wording used 
earlier in the Protocol that urges Parties to take a precautionary approach.  In fact, the 
articles laying out the terms for taking decisions on imports (Articles 10  and 11) clearly 
invoke the main elements of the precautionary principle, stating that:  “Lack of scientific 
certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the 
extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism… shall not prevent 
that Party from taking a decision … with regard to the import of that living modified 
organism … in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects” (emphasis 
added). 
 
The risk assessment must be based on available scientific evidence, to allow the 
importing country to identify and evaluate possible threats to biodiversity (Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity 2000). According to the IUCN, “evidence that 
might not be regarded as scientific – for example, indigenous and traditional knowledge 
and information, as well as anecdotal information – might also be considered where 
relevant, provided consideration is carried out in a scientifically sound and transparent 
manner” (IUCN 2003).  
 
Indeed, Article 26 allows Parties, in reaching a decision on whether or not to 
import an LMO, to “take into account, consistent with their international obligations, 
socioeconomic considerations arising from the impact of living modified organisms on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially with regard to the 
value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities” (Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 2000).  
 
Parties are also asked to “endeavor to ensure that any LMO… has undergone an 
appropriate period of observation that is commensurate with its life-cycle or generation 
time before it is put to its intended use.” The language does not specify if the observation 
must take place in the importing country, or can take place elsewhere. The IUCN 
elaborates that “if an initial risk assessment suggests that there are significant differences 
between the place where the period of observation has occurred and the receiving 
environment, then a further period of observation… may be necessary” (IUCN 2003).  
Accordingly, then, Mexico could choose to delay importation of particular LMOs if it felt 
that the tests conducted in the U.S. or elsewhere did not accurately reflect the 
environment into which they would be introduced in Mexico, which is most likely the 
case, and could require that in-country tests be carried out before trade could take place.  
 
Key to the functioning of the Protocol is the labeling requirement, which has 
undergone several changes since the Protocol was first agreed to in 2000. Original 
language required that Parties exporting LMOs for use as food, feed, or for processing 
label the shipments as “may contain LMOs,” and that the labels include the instruction 
that the contents were not intended for introduction into the environment (Article 18). 
The labeling requirements would apply to any shipments of LMOs entering the territory 
of a Party to the agreement if they chose to make such requirements part of national law, 
regardless if the country of origin was a non-Party.  If Mexico had adopted such labeling 
requirements as allowed under the Protocol, the U.S. and Canada would have been 
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obliged to comply in their trade with Mexico even though neither had signed the 
Protocol.  
 
The specific details of the labels were to be worked out in official meetings within 
two years after the Protocol took effect (September 2003) (Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity 2000). However, no specifics had been agreed to by 2005. In 
March 2006, the COP3 finally came to consensus on labeling requirements, a process in 
which the Mexican government played a disruptive role. The final requirements are as 
follows:  
 
•  Products that have been clearly identified and separated as transgenics will 
have to carry the label “contains LMOs” and will need to carry specific 
information on the LMOs contained in the shipment. 
•  The wording “may contain LMOs” is allowed in cases in which the presence 
of transgenics has not been documented and identified from origin. 
•  A Brazilian proposal recommended a four-year transitional period to allow 
countries to gradually adopt the mandatory labeling. Negotiators expanded 
that period to six years. 
•  In four years, the fifth “meeting of the parties” (MOP5) will evaluate how 
well the labeling clause has been implemented, to help orient the final 
decision to be reached at MOP6 in 2012.  
 
Mexico blocked MOP3 negotiations until the Parties agreed to a clause stating 
that rules on labeling will not apply to transboundary transport between Parties to the 
Protocol and Non-Parties, a restatement of what in fact is international law, but 
legitimating in legal terms what many observers considered a tripartite agreement 
between the three countries that contravened the spirit, if not the letter, of the Protocol 
(International Grain Trade Coalition 2006; Kalaitzandonakes 2006; Osava 2006). 
Therefore, trade between the United States, Canada, and Mexico does not have to abide 
by the labeling requirements of the Protocol, even though Mexico has a legal right to 
require the same information on LMO shipments from these non-Parties as it requires 
from Parties to the Protocol, much as the European Union has been doing. This trilateral 
agreement governing trade in LMOs between the three NAFTA countries, described 
below, is in effect at least until December 1, 2006, but will likely be extended under the 
Calderon administration.   
 
The text of the Protocol allows Parties and Non-Parties to enter into agreements 
and arrangements on trade in LMOs, provided they are consistent with the objective of 
the Protocol (Article 24).  In 2003, in part to pre-empt MOP3 determinations of the 
labeling requirements, the governments of Canada, Mexico and the U.S. entered into a 
Trilateral Arrangement to define the labeling requirements called for in Article 18. The 
arrangement stated that although the U.S. and Canada are not Parties to the CPB, they 
would abide by Article 24 of the Protocol. But the agreement called for a very weak 
labeling scheme.  The exporter must only document that a shipment “may contain” 
LMOs for all shipments with more than 5% LMO content.  For shipments requiring the 
“may contain” warning, the exporter is not obligated to identify the specific LMOs in the 
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shipment, undercutting one of the key provisions regarding safe handling. The agreement 
was to be in effect for two years and was extended through December 1, 2006 
(International Grain Trade Coalition 2005).  Since Mexico was able to get agreement on 
language exempting non-Parties from the labeling requirements, it is not yet clear 
whether the three countries are comfortable enough with the new Protocol language to 
allow the trilateral agreement to lapse. 
 
If Mexico and its North American trading partners have skillfully maneuvered 
around the Protocol’s labeling requirements, where is the space for alternative maize 
policies in the Protocol?  While Mexico may not be in violation of the agreement now, 
any government committed to developing policies more supportive of traditional maize 
producers would find a great deal of room to move.  
 
Parties to the Protocol cannot impose commitments on non-Parties, but Article 
24(1) obliges the signatory Party to ensure consistency with the objective of the Protocol 
in all trade with non-Parties, including the precautionary approach outlined in Principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration regarding the safe transfer, handling, and use of LMOs. This 
includes the obligation to ensure that activities involving LMOs are undertaken in a 
manner that prevents or reduces the risks to biological diversity, taking also into account 
risks to human health (Article 2(2)), and the obligation to establish and maintain 
appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies to regulate, manage and control risks 
associated with the use, handling and transboundary movement of LMOs (Article 16(1)). 
The Protocol calls for equivalent protection measures to those agreed among the Parties 
to the agreement, which includes a means of providing the importing country with an 
opportunity and a basis for deciding whether or not to consent to the importation of 
LMOs (IUCN 2003).  This would imply full disclosure in labeling to identify the specific 
LMOs being shipped into Mexico. 
 
As of now, NAFTA would take precedence over Mexico’s obligations under the 
Cartagena Protocol in any case.  NAFTA’s Articles 103-105 provide for the list of 
environmental and conservation agreements that take precedence over NAFTA, a list that 
includes at this point only: The Convention on Endangered Species, the Montreal 
Protocol on ozone, the Basel Convention on hazardous wastes, and the agreement 
between the United States and Mexico on the Border Environment.  Neither the 
Convention on Biological Diversity nor the Cartagena Protocol is given precedence 
explicitly, though ongoing multilateral negotiations in the WTO over the relationship 
between trade and environmental agreements could have an impact on how NAFTA is 
interpreted in this regard. 
 
In any case, Mexico has ample opportunities under the Protocol to create the 
space for new maize policies.  Among the measures Mexico could take unilaterally: 
 
•  Ask to have the Cartagena Protocol added to the list of agreements that take 
precedence over NAFTA; 
•  Tighten the labeling requirements for imported LMOs, citing the Protocol’s 
mandate for security measures equivalent to those observed among the 
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agreement’s signatories.  This could include stricter trigger points, below the 
current 5% threshold, and the detailing of specific LMOs included in a 
shipment. 
•  Hold up shipments based on the Protocol’s call to ensure testing of LMOs in 
the environments in which they could be introduced.  Mexico’s mega-diverse, 
open-pollinated maize agriculture has little in common with the hybrid 
monocultures in which transgenic corn varieties have been tested. 
•  Cite the Protocol’s mandate for Parties to “prevent adverse effects of the LMO 
on… biological diversity,” its recognition of the precautionary principle, and 
its broad recognition of indigenous knowledge and rights to review all policies 
related to the importation of transgenic maize, which includes virtually all 
maize imported from the United States. 
 
Three important findings strengthen Mexico’s claim to such policy space.  First, 
as a member of the OECD, Mexico is party to several non-binding agreements to 
“harmonize” standards for biotechnology, particularly in relation to maize because of the 
country’s importance as its center of origin (OECD 2000). 
   
Second, Mexico’s own Biosafety Law on Genetically Modified Organisms, while 
weak, contains a mandate to create a Special Regime to Protect Maize before any 
transgenic maize is released for planting in Mexico.  The Mexican government has done 
little to comply with this mandate and has continued to explore relaxing the moratorium 
on the experimental and commercial planting of transgenic maize.  A group of farmers, 
scientists, and non-governmental organizations, however, has published a “manifesto” 
calling for the full implementation of the mandate. 
 
Third, Mexico can cite the findings of NAFTA’s own Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), which carried out the most extensive scientific 
review to date on the danger of transgenic contamination of traditional maize fields.  The 
CEC research documented evidence of extensive contamination across many states, 
confirmed the likely source as imported GMO corn distributed as food through a 
Mexican government agency, and suggested that the preponderance of evidence and the 
remaining uncertainty called for a precautionary approach to the importation of 
transgenic corn.  The final recommendations, which were strongly opposed by the U.S. 
government, included the call to allow into Mexico only corn that had been milled so that 
it could not be planted inadvertently by farmers (NACEC 2004). 
  
The Mexican government has casually ignored all these obligations and 
recommendations, but together they constitute a compelling case for invoking the policy 
space afforded by the Cartagena Protocol to slow and regulate maize imports, which 
would principally affect those from the United States.  Two other international 
agreements are worth noting in this regard as well, though they are not limited to the 
question of biotechnology crops. 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity – A meeting of the parties to the CBD 
took place in Brazil in March 2006.  The conference articulated new language that could 
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be relevant to the maize question.  The benefit-sharing provisions call for an international 
regime on access and benefit-sharing to facilitate access to genetic resources, ensure fair 
distribution of benefits from their use, protect the rights of indigenous and local 
communities to their traditional knowledge, and develop national and local models for 
protecting traditional knowledge.  Perhaps most important, the recent meeting called for 
establishing a mechanism (e.g. certificate of origin) to provide certainty about the origin 
of genetic resources.  Such measures could provide additional weight to any effort by 
Mexico to protect the diversity of its maize resources. 
 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Agriculture – Also 
known as “The Law of the Seed,” this agreement was developed under the auspices of the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization. It excludes 35 food crops and 29 forage plants 
from Intellectual Property Rights protection, instead guaranteeing free exchange and 
access to these plants as a public good. The agreement also contains strong Farmers 
Rights provisions.  Parties are broadly obligated “to ensure the conformity of their laws, 
regulations and procedures with their obligations as provided in the Treaty.” 
 
The treaty includes a remarkable array of goals for the maintenance of these key 
food crops, including: 
•  Promote or support farmers’ and local communities’ efforts to manage and 
conserve on-farm their plant genetic resources; 
•  Promote in situ conservation of wild crop relatives and wild plants for food 
production by supporting the efforts of indigenous and local communities; 
•  Parties shall, as appropriate, take steps to minimize or, if possible, eliminate 
threats to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; 
•  Develop and maintain appropriate policy and legal measures that promote the 
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, including fair 
agricultural policies that promote the development and maintenance of diverse 
farming systems that enhance biological diversity, and expanded use of local and 
locally adapted crops. 
 
Remarkably, Mexico has neither signed nor ratified the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The United States has signed but not 
ratified it, while Canada has both signed and ratified it.  As one of the world’s most 
agriculturally diverse countries, and the center of origin for important food crops, Mexico 
should be party to this important treaty.  If Mexico signed and ratified the treaty, the 
government could theoretically join Canada in petitioning to have the Treaty added to the 
list of environmental and conservation agreements that take precedence over NAFTA.  
Such a move would open up significant space for supportive maize policies. 
 
Addressing the State of Emergency for Mexican Maize 
 
The Mexican government has a great deal of policy space to pursue more 
supportive policies toward the country’s traditional maize farmers.  A government 
dedicated to its rural sector and the ecological wealth on which it is based could increase 
its own farm subsidies dramatically, impose countervailing duties for the heavy 
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subsidization of U.S. corn, and invoke a wide range of environmental findings and 
agreements.  What is lacking is the political will to take such actions, just as there is little 
political will to renegotiate the relevant agricultural provisions of NAFTA. 
 
Policies to protect Mexico’s agro-biodiversity in maize must promote rural 
livelihoods and development while recognizing the market failures endemic to the sector.  
Such policies will need to reassert a strong role for the government in a variety of areas.  
Many of these policies represent a significant departure from the neoliberal model that 
has guided Mexican rural policy for the last 15-20 years.   
 
Mexico needs to address two distinct problems: chronic rural poverty, which the 
neoliberal model has failed to address due to inadequate job creation; and the current and 
threatened loss of maize genetic diversity.  The two are inextricably connected.  Rural 
livelihoods will not be strengthened through the industrialization of agriculture, given the 
limitations in the development of the export agricultural sector.  Rather than seeking to 
replace peasant agriculture with modern agricultural methods or with expanded service or 
industrial sectors, policies should build on the value that exists in traditional agriculture.  
One key aspect of that value is maize genetic diversity.  Mexico has the policy space to 
chart a new path if it can find the political will. 
 
 
Timothy A. Wise is Deputy Director of the Global Development and Environment 
Institute at Tufts University; inquiries can be directed to tim.wise@tufts.edu. 
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